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may be aa prophetic and anticipatory of truth as anything else
we have, and some of them more so than others, cannot pos-
sibly be denied. But what hope is there of squaring and settling
opinions unless Absolutism will hold parley on this common
ground; and will admit that all philosophies are hypotheses,
to which all our faculties, emotional as well as logical, help us,
and the truest of which will at the final integration of. things
be found in possession of the men whose faculties on the whole
had the best divining power ?
CAN A MAN SIN AGAINST KNOWLEDGE?
By F. H. BRADLEY.
There is an old paradox which at some time we must all have
encountered. That no one sins willingly, and that vice is igno-
rance, must at some time have been offered to us all as gospel.
And most of us, I presume, have long ago concluded that a truth
has here been pressed into a falsehood. We naturally reflect that,
as for the artist beauty rules the universe and is the dominant
reality, so for the reasoning philosopher reason is the king and
master both of the world and of the soul. And we have per-
suaded ourselves that such prepossessions lead to conflict with
fact. For not only may the ruler at times be absent, but even if
he is present, yet appetite defies him, and, with no cloak of igno-
rance, sins wilfully and knowingly in the master's sight.
I cannot think that our persuasion is false. For me, too, the
old gospel has joined the museum of one-sided growths, and,
with " the practical reason," has been placed on the shelf of
interesting illusions. I would not seek to revive them ; but, on
the contrary, my object is to remove a hindrance to their well-
earned repose. There is a psychological doubt which remains
unsatisfied, and serves as the foundation for a serious mistake.
Our experiences seem discrepant. For myself, and in my own
mind, I am able to verify the presence of wrong-doing in the face
of and despite the voice of conscience. I feel sure of this fact, but
others are not certain, while others again within their experience
are certain of the opposite. They assure me that never until con-
science has slumbered, never until for the moment they have for-
gotten the quality of their act, are they able to give way to an
unmoral impulse.
It is not likely that any of us are quite mistaken about the
fact. When an observer tells us that with him bad action never
co-exists with present knowledge, that an actual consciousness of
its immorality is incompatible with the victory of any desire, we
may be sure that he is not wholly in error. He has observed a
fact, but observed it wrongly ; and our task is to show that his
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mistake has come from a view that is partial, and an interpreta-
tion that is erroneous.
Perhaps the most convenient way of pointing out the root of
the error will be for me to invent a defence, which will show
what I think is the source of delusion. And if I dwell upon
truths which we all understand, I may excuse myself by observing
that, if all of us understand them, nearly all of us make mistakes
because we disregard them.
What defence can we find for the doctrine that knowledge
excludes wrong action ? We are not forced to invoke the obsolete
primacy of the " practical reason " : we may move to the ground
of a saner psychology and may rest upon fact. For we may urge,
' No one knows an act to be wrong unless he has an idea of the
wrongness. But if t.Viia be admitted, observe what follows : the
idea of wrong implies the feeling of wrong. And this consequence
is certain ; for our ideas, we know, are representative signs, and
to perceive the signification without the presence of the whole
qign is quite impossible. Thus when you nave in your mind the
idea of a horse or a cow or a bad action, you possess a present
image, part of which you neglect, and part of which you take as your
meaning, and use as the idea of something not present but repre-
sented. But now what is it that could represent a horse but
something present in the form of a horse-image ? And what is it
again that could be the idea of a moral or of an immoral act,
unless it were something present to the mind in one of these
qualities ? But to be present to the mind as moral or immoral
implies a feeling of right or wrong. What represents, and is used
as the idea of the act, must therefore imply a corresponding
emotional element. If so, however, the conclusion seems proved ;
for since what represents right or wrong is emotional, it therefore,
because it is emotional, will work. I t will not indeed work as the
idea of something else, but it will work as the actual present
state. It will be the badness that is felt, and not the badness that
is thought, which will have power to move us. In other words, it
is the whole sign that is active, and not the mere signification.
But this will make no difference. Since you cannot represent
the wrong that is signified without the present image which is
felt as wrong, the knowledge of vice must thus be per accident a
dislike to viciousness, and this felt aversion, psychologically im-
plied in all ideas of immorality, will fetter the will, until, with
the knowledge, the feeling disappears.
' And we may support this defence by an appeal to the general
theory of motives. A motive, if that means the object of our desire
or aversion, must be the idea of something pleasant or painful.
And thus (I have argued in my Ethical Studies), if the motive is
the end and is so an idea, then what moves is never the motive
as such. But on the other hand the motive will move per accidens.
For an idea implies a representative state of mind, and that state
of mind must havo present existence as a psychical phenomenon.
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The state which represents something pleasant or painful most
furthermore itself be pleasant or painful. The idea will thus indi-
rectly imply a feeling, and in this indirect way a motive will
move.
' And by this we may not only support our paradox, but
may prop up, besides, another doctrine. To suppose that what
promises to be most pleasant must always move us, we know is a
mistake, because the promised is an idea, while the mover ia
feeling. But, since the future prospect of the most pleasant could
not be represented to us in idea, unless there were a feeling which
served as the sign, hence, through this feeling and per accidens, the
promise will move, and, per accident again, the promise of the most
pleasant will move us the most.'
Such is the defence which we may place in the mouth of our
failing paradox, and this defence, though erroneous, still is based
on a solid foundation. The reader may refuse to follow us through
these psychological subtleties, but I am sure that any one who
is not at home in them is threatened by errors from every side.
The defence we have put forward amounts to this : an idea not
only represents something else beside itself, but is in itself an
existing phenomenon, and in this capacity does psychological
work. And hence the idea of immorality will be felt as an actual
painful fact, and so will repel; while, again, the idea of the
greatest pleasure will be felt as most pleasant, and so must
attract.
The mistake that is made here is tolerably simple. I t is true
that the idea of a pleasure or a wrong act must imply a feeling,
and that this feeling will do some work. But it is not true that
the feeling need determine the will to avoid or pursue the object
of the idea. This is perfectly obvious, and our experience of the
contest of discrepant impulses puts it beyond doubt. What is
felt pleasant or painful will determine us or not, according as it
stands to our whole state of desire. We need ask no hard ques-
tions about the nature of desire, but may state the matter thus.
Admitting that pleasure and pain are what move us, it is still not
mere pleasure nor again mere pain that determines the move-
ment. It is the greatest felt pleasure, or the balance of pleasure
or pain, that will succeed. And hence obviously, when we ask
if a feeling will work, the question is a question of that feeling's
intensity, and a question of its comparative intensity.
We snail agree, I hope, that the above is obvious ; but it gives
us a key to the puzzle before us. When an observer maintains
that he cannot act against a wakeful conscience, what happens in
his mind, I think, is this. He has fixed his attention upon the
wrongful quality of the act, and that fixing of the attention has
important results. In the first place it is exclusive; that is, it
keeps out other ideas, and so removes the conflicting influence of
their feelings. In the second place (I do not ask how these two
functions are connected) the attention strengthens; that is,
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through attention the idea becomes clearer, and the images
and feelings involved in that idea become also stronger; s^ Ahat
to resist such an isolated and heightened prompting is njjw
impossible. Hence, if our observer were to say, ' When I realise
•with vividness the immorality of my act, I cannot, while I do
so, go on to commit it,' I think that his statement would be quite
correct. I t would be in accordance both with sound psychology
and with the evidence of fact.
But such a modified statement would fail to carry the required
conclusion. It would not show that, when my conscience is
aroused, I am unable then to oppose it and defeat it. For, in the
first place, when we have before us the idea of a bad act, our
attention need not be concentrated upon this one element of our
whole state of mind. On the contrary, we may try to observe
indifferently all the discordant factors of our complex condition ;
and, if we do this, our idea of the immorality of the act will not
gain any relative increase of strength. And again, and in the
second place, there is a very great difference between ideas.
Some are highly symbolic, and in this case their effect on the
imagination and feelings is comparatively weak.
I will try to explain this second point. Suppose, for example,
I have thought of something pleasant, and then am asked to
think of something twice as pleasant. I am able to perform this
in more ways than one. I may retain the pleasant image which
I already have, and which has furnished me with my idea of the
represented pleasure; I may increase the pleasantness of that
pleasant image, and may use this increase as a sign of something
that is twice as pleasant. In this case we might roughly and
inaccurately say that what represents twice the pleasure is itself
actually felt to be doubly pleasant. But I may take another
course: I need not try to double my pleasant image, but may
qualify it from outside by another and a foreign image of quantity-.
That is, I may call up an image of something not pleasant, which
is increased twofold, and I may use this as a sign to stand for
ttoice ; and adding this from the outside to my idea of something
pleasant, I may so indirectly acquire the idea of what is doubly
pleasant. In this case I do not say that the effect on the feelings
and on the imagination will vanish wholly, but I am sure we shall
agree that it will be much diminished.
The point is so important that I perhaps may be allowed
another illustration. I have the image of a horse before my mind,
and I want to think of a hundred horses. Now, to do this, I need
not try to have before me a hundred horse-images, but may apply
the idea of a hundred from elsewhere. No doubt, this idea of a
hundred times must rest upon tome present image, but there is no
sort of reason why it should rest on the obscure image of a
hundred horses. In the same way, if I desire to think of a horse
one hundred times as large as the first, I need not struggle to
magnify my present horse-image. I may employ some other
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obscure image, take from that the idea of hundredfoldness, and
employ this to modify my idea of a horse.
And we may strengthen our position by a familiar experience.
We all know that as a rule it is impossible to recall either vivid
pleasures or vivid pains. But it would be wrong to say that I
nave not the knowledge that my pleasure or my pain was very
great. I do know this; but I know it discursively and by the
intellectual addition of the idea of intensity to my idea of the
feeling. And hence the effect on the imagination and emotions
may be very weak ; it may serve in temptation but to sour the
pleasure without preventing the sin. In a corrupted state, where
the passions are enfeebled and where cruel experience has opened
the eyes without changing the heart, we may find the condition
described by Lamb, " the sin and the suffering co-instantaneous,
or the latter forerunning the former, remorse preceding action ".
The result of this is that the idea of a greater pleasure need
not in itself be felt as more pleasant, nor the idea of a greater
pain as more painful. The increase of feeling, if it takes place at
all, need take place in no proportion to the increase thought of.
This again must be true of the idea of wrong-doing. I may
qualify my idea of a certain act by the addition of immorality, but
I may transfer that addition from another and wholly separate
image. In this case my knowledge that an act is baa does not
rest on an image of the act as bad. I t consists primarily in the
intellectual use of a symbol, and the secondary effect on the
imagination and the feelings may be almost inappreciable.
Our ethical paradox, if true at all, will be true only of a mind
which is confined to intuition; and such a mind is not known to
exist, except at an early stage of evolution. But any mind which
can abstract and reflect and reason discursively will be able to think
of an act as being wrong, and yet the feeling of that act's wrong-
ness may not pass beyond an ineffective minimum It is only where
the attention is concentred upon the quality of the act, and even
then it is only where the act in its wrongful quality is present as
a vivid imagination, that the conscience will be irresistible. I t is
not knowledge, it is a relative degree of feeling excited by a
certain kind of knowledge, that coerces the appetite.
This, I think, will furnish us with a partial justification of our
paradox, and it also may serve as its final refutation.
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